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I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right of privacy is a judicially created doctrine
that is said to emanate from the "penumbra"' of the Bill of Rights.2
This right of privacy has been recognized in specific areas of individ-
ual rights such as freedom of choice in marital, family and procrea-
tive matters.3 The right of privacy has also evolved into individual
1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice Douglas
found a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives repugnant to the mar-
ital right "of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at
485. He stated that marriage is "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights." Id. at
486. Justice Douglas stated for the first time that the "specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras... that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. His
theory was that citizens have certain "fundamental constitutional rights [even absent
specific enumeration in the Bill of Rights]... which have a value ... essential to indi-
vidual liberty." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
2. The Bill of Rights was made applicable to the states via the Court's "incorpo-
ration" of these provisions into the fourteenth amendment. J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at
455. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was increasingly invoked by
litigants claiming protection against state action. "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The ability of the Court to enforce the
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights on the states created conflict among legal
scholars. It is generally agreed that "[t]oday virtually all of the Bill of Rights have
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the states."
J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 455. For an excellent treatment of the historical interpre-
tation of the fourteenth amendment, see Fairman, Does The Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
3. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court struck down a statute which
prohibited interracial marriage because it deprived individuals of the freedom to
choose whom to marry. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the
Court held unconstitutional a statute that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a "nuclear" family. Justice Powell, in writing for the majority, noted that
"certain rights associated with the family [had] been accorded shelter under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause," and that "the family choice involved in this
case ... [should be accorded] the force and rationale of these precedents." Id. at 501.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court struck down a Texas statute which pro-
scribed abortions except to save the life of the mother. The majority held the statute
violated the "right of personal privacy [which] included the abortion decision" and it
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 154.
More recently, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169
freedom of choice in certain other highly personal activities. How-
ever, the confines of this right remain undefined.4 The Court has not
recognized an individual's constitutional right to engage in private
consensual sex.5
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to recognize such a right
in Bowers v. Hardwick.6 Michael Hardwick, a homosexual, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Georgia statute criminalizing sod-
omy. 7 Hardwick claimed that he had a constitutionally protected
right of privacy to engage in "nonprocreative sex."s  The issue
presented was whether the Constitution granted a "fundamental
right to homosexuals to engage in sodomy."9 Much to the consterna-
tion of Hardwick and homosexuals alike,1o the Court refused to ex-
tend the right of privacy, holding "that none of the rights [previously
recognized] . . . bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
(1986), the Court struck down a statute that required "too" much information about
the woman and the circumstances under which she had an abortion. The Court felt
that a "woman and her physician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abor-
tion if there exists a possibility that her decision and her identity will become known
publicly," thereby, "chill[ing] the exercise of constitutional rights." Id. at 2182. The
Court continued to protect the freedom of choice related to procreative matters. See
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886 (1978) [hereinafter L. TRIBE].
Professor Tribe believes that definitional attempts to classify the right of privacy and
personhood are unsuccessful because they "leave essentially unspecified the substance
of what is being protected, telling us neither the character of the choices or the infor-
mation we are to classify as special." Id. at 887.
5. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that "any claim that these [privacy] cases nevertheless stand for the prop-
osition that any kind of private sexual conduct ... is constitutionally insulated from
state proscription is unsupportable." Id. at 2844. See Post v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 1105,
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 290 (1986). In Post, a heterosexual couple engaged in oral and
anal sex and the male was charged under section 886 of title 21. Post, 715 P.2d at 1106.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1983). The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
found that the male did not violate the statute as his "right of privacy ... includes the
right to select consensual adult partners." Id. at 1109. See also J. NOWAK, supra note
1, at 735.
6. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
7. The code reads in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another ....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by im-
prisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
8. Brief for Respondent at 12, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (No. 85-
140). Hardwick believed that the Court's holding in previous right of privacy cases
mandated "heightened scrutiny ... of state restrictions on non-procreative sex ...
whether between married persons or unmarried individuals." Id.
9. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
10. Freiberg, Supreme Court Decision Sparks Protest, THE ADVOC., Aug. 5, 1986, at
12. Freiberg lists the gay demonstrations that took place as a result of the Court's
holding in Hardwick.
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right."11 Justice White's majority opinion in Hardwick signaled the
continued reluctance of the Court to recognize an individual's right
to engage in sex,12 and slowed the previous trend of its expansion of
the right of privacy.13
In examining the Court's exercise of judicial restraint, this note be-
gins by briefly discussing the development of the fundamental right
of privacy. It will trace the expansion of this protected right as it
pertains to the range of privacy interests held sacrosanct by the
Court. In addition, this note will examine the majority and concur-
ring opinions and their rationales for exercising judicial restraint and
set forth the arguments made by the dissenting opinions. This note
will conclude with an analysis of the impact of the decision in Hard-
wick on society in general and homosexual rights in particular.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The specific right of "privacy" was derived from the more general
doctrine of "fundamental rights."14 It was not until the 193715 case of
11. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
12. Id. See also J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 758. Nowak discusses the Court's ra-
tionale regarding the right of privacy as it relates to sexual activity.
13. See supra note 3 for an analysis of the Court's cases expanding the right of
privacy. Hardwick signaled a change in the Court's previous trend of expansion.
14. The contextual history of "fundamental rights" is bifurcated. Professor Tribe
refers to the first era as the "Lochner era, 1897-1937." L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 435.
He believes that prior to 1937, the Court was more willing to invalidate economic legis-
lation as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It was
during this period that the Court scrutinized a state's economic legislation pursuant to
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897), where the Court invalidated a statute which prohibited insurance
contracts unless the insurance company was licensed to do business in Louisiana. The
Court stated the statute was unconstitutional because it "deprive[d] the citizen of [the
right to contract] .. . without due process of law." Id. at 591.
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court invalidated a state law that
limited the number of hours a baker could work. The Court held that "the right to
purchase or sell labor is part of the liberty protected by [the fourteenth] amendment"
and therefore held the law unconstitutional. Id. at 53. According to Professor Nowak,
the Lochner decision exemplified the Court's willingness to use the substantive due
process doctrine "to protect the free enterprise system as it was embodied in the con-
cept of laissez faire" during the period of 1897-1937. J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 438.
The second era began with the Court's 1937 decision in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the Court held that citizens have certain fundamental rights
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights which are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Id. at 325.
15. See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965) (analysis of the his-
torical setting prior to the Palko decision).
Palko v. Connecticut16 that the Court first held that citizens have
fundamental rights "brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by
a process of absorption."1 7 In the majority opinion, Justice Cardozo
discerned these substantive fundamental rights "to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, [become] valid as against the states."' 8 As a result of the find-
ings in Palko, the Court began to recognize certain fundamental
rights not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.19 Subse-
quently, one of the fundamental rights recognized was the right of
privacy.
A. The Fundamental Right of Privacy
The right of privacy was born in Justice Harlan's 20 dissenting opin-
ion in Poe v. Ullman.21 In Poe, the majority declined to adjudicate
the constitutional issue presented by a Connecticut statute criminal-
izing the use of contraceptives by married couples, resting its holding
on the lack of a justifiable controversy.22 In his dissent, however,
Justice Harlan stated that the statute violated the fourteenth amend-
ment and was an "intolerable and unjustified invasion of privacy in
the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal
life."23
It was not until four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,24 that
the Court formally recognized that individuals have certain constitu-
tional rights of privacy.25 In Griswold, the same Connecticut statute
challenged in Poe was deemed unconstitutional.26 Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, espoused for the first time the Court's view
16. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17. Id. at 326.
18. Id. at 325.
19. Kauper, supra note 15, at 237.
20. This may be misleading. The concept was originally stated in Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). However, their theory of pri-
vacy rested in the area of tort law and the "freedom from intrusion . . . [and] from
disclosures of information about the individual's private life." Id. Justice Harlan's ap-
plication was the first to be centered on constitutional principles.
21. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
22. Id. at 509.
23. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also supra note 1.
25. 381 U.S. at 482-84.
26. The Court's seemingly paradoxical conclusions in Poe and Griswold reflected a
change in the composition of the Court. In Poe, 367 U.S. at 498, two of the five Justices
who voted to uphold the statute were Justice Frankfurter and Justice Whittaker. Jus-
tice Frankfurter retired on August 28, 1962, and President John F. Kennedy appointed
Justice Goldberg. See Letter from John F. Kennedy to the United States (Sept. 28,
1962) (discussing Mr. Justice Goldberg's nomination). Justice Whittaker retired on
April 1, 1962, and President John F. Kennedy appointed Justice White. See Letter
from John F. Kennedy to the United States (April 12, 1962) (discussing appointment of
Mr. Justice White). In Griswold, the two new Justices voted to hold the statute uncon-
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that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras...
that help give them life and substance."27 He stated that marriage is
a "right... older than the Bill of Rights,"28 and held that the statute
violated this sense of privacy in marriage. Therefore, the statute was
unconstitutional. Thus, the "constitutional . . . right of privacy [for-
mally] emerged out of the background of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights."29 Griswold, however, opened the doors for subsequent judi-
cial definition of the implied right of privacy.
B. The Right of Privacy Concerning Marriage, Family and
Procreation
Generally, Griswold is construed as the beginning3O of the Court's
recognition of the right of privacy. Its progeny expand and define
protection for a range of individual privacy interests.31 The following
cases exemplify the Court's restrictive, although activist, interpreta-
tion of the right of privacy.
In Loving v. Virginia,3 2 the Court struck down a statute which
barred interracial marriage. Justice Stewart, writing for the major-
ity, stated that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the free-
dom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
stitutional. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, 502 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (White, J., concur-
ring).
More importantly, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion influenced how Justice
Brennan and Chief Justice Warren voted. However, his opinion did not represent the
recognition of individual privacy rights through the fourteenth amendment. Griswold,
381 U.S. at 486. Rather, Justice Goldberg believed that "Connecticut's birth-control
law unconstitutionally intrude[d] upon the right of marital privacy... [not via the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment but via] the language and history of the
ninth amendment." Id. at 486-87. See also Kauper, supra note 15, at 244-46, for an
analysis of Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion.
27. 381 U.S. at 484. See also supra note 1.
28. 381 U.S. at 486.
29. D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 178 (1979) [hereinafter D.
O'BRIEN].
30. Griswold was decided in 1965. The Court in the 1923 decision of Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), invalidated a statute which prohibited all grade schools
from teaching subjects in any language other than English. However, the holding did
not represent the recognition of individual privacy rights. The Court's decision "may
only have reflected the attitude of the Court towards government regulation during
the apex of 'substantive due process.'" J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 735. See also supra
note 13.
31. D. O'BRIEN, supra note 29, at 191-94.
32. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also supra note 3.
cannot be infringed by the State."33
The watershed case for the protection of family interests is Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.34 In Moore, the city's statute "limit[ed] oc-
cupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family."35 This
limitation on the definition of a family was held unconstitutional.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that the statute's ex-
clusion of extended families "slic[ed] deeply into the family itself."36
"'[The] Court has long recognized... freedom of personal choice in
matters of . . .family life [as] one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "37
Seven years after Griswold,38 the Court again confronted the right
of privacy as it pertained to procreation in Eisenstadt v. Baird.39 The
majority held that individuals, whether married or single, have the
right to use contraceptives. 40 Justice Brennan, writing for the major-
ity, expressed the belief that "[i]f the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from
governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting per-
sons as the decision whether to bear or beget [a] child."41 In Carey v.
Population Services International,42 the Court further expanded the
right when it held that minors had the right to receive contraceptives
without parental consent. 43 In Carey, Justice Brennan held that "ac-
cess [for all persons] is essential to exercise of the constitutionally
protected right of decision in matters of childbearing."44
33. 388 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
34. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See supra note 3. See also Comment, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio: The Emergence of the Right of Family Choice in Zoning, 5 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 547 (1978) (interpretation of the Court's decision as it related to the
constitutional right of privacy concerning the family).
35. 431 U.S. at 495-96. The statute defined the single family as the individual
members of a single housekeeping unit, limited to the nominal head of household, his
or her spouse, and the children and parents of either or both. Id. at 496 n.2.
36. Id. at 498.
37. Id. at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). The other personal choices the Court has "long recognized" in-
clude the following: Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the parent's due
process right to send their children to private schools); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (the parent's due process right to have their children taught a foreign
language). See supra note 13 regarding individual due process rights during the Loch-
ner era.
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. Id. The Court found no rational basis for the statute to distinguish between
married and unmarried persons. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 590-99
which describes the standards of review for determining the rationality behind a
statute.
41. D. O'BRIEN, supra note 29, at 188 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
42. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
43. Id. The Court determined no legitimate state interest existed justifying a state
requirement of parental consent. Id. at 694.
44. Id. at 688-89.
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It was precisely Justice Brennan's rationale in Carey that led to the
Court's decision in the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade.45 The Court dis-
cerned that a new "right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy."46 There are many critics of the Court's 1973 decision in Roe
v. Wade.47 Some believe that the decision was "posited" on a theory
that "'the individual is sovereign . . . [and] his independence
absolute.' "48
Others feel that the Court was clearly "prepared to adopt a very
broad view of its own constitutional powers."49 Nonetheless, the
Court's holding further expanded the coverage afforded by the right
of privacy.
The right of privacy as expanded by the Court now encompasses
the following: the freedom to marry anyone;5 0 the freedom for mar-
ried,S1 single,52 and minor5 3 women to use contraceptives; the free-
dom to live with extended family relations;54 and the freedom for a
woman (single or married) to decide whether or not to have an abor-
tion.5 5 While the outer limits of privacy have not been reached by
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Id. at 153.
47. See, e.g., Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159 (critical analysis of the Court's standing and mootness in
abortion cases); Ely, The Wages of Crying WoW A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973) (critical analysis of the Court's use of substantive due process power to
expand the right of privacy).
48. Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark. Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitu-
tional Processes, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1, 99 (1976) (quoting John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY 21-
22 (3d ed. 1864).
49. Epstein, supra note 47, at 159. Also, Professor Tribe adroitly stated the
following:
The Court intervened in areas at least partially frozen by institutional con-
straints. In Roe... the entanglement of religious issues ... created unusual
legislative rigidity .... [This] was exacerbated by the relatively lax enforce-
ment of abortion laws .... [A]t [this] juncture, abortion was ... available to
the relatively wealthy; this legislatively influential group... ha[d] less inter-
est in exerting pressure for in-state reform. All would have depended, there-
fore, upon the purely ideological clash between the advocates of female
liberation and the advocates of fetal rights.
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 317-18 (1975).
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra note 3.
51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 1 and 3.
52. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See supra text accomnpanying note 40.
53. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See supra text accompa-
nying note 42.
54. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See supra note 3.
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra note 3.
the Court,5 6 "the decisions that individuals may make without unjus-
tified government interference are personal decisions [limited] to
marriage, procreation, [and] family relations."57
C. The Right of Privacy for Sexual Relations
The emerging issue is whether a constitutional right exists, in the
"penumbra"58 of the Bill of Rights, to engage in private, sexual prac-
tices outside the realm of the traditional marriage or procreative re-
lationships. Although the Court has recognized as sacrosanct some
rights of privacy, it has refused to recognize an individual's constitu-
tional right to engage in private consensual sex.5 9 Most of the stat-
utes that regulate private sexual practices criminalize "unnatural"
sex 60 and are premised on the general belief that the conduct is im-
moral.6l The sexual conduct that has created the most vociferous
controversy is homosexual sodomy.6 2 Justice Harlan succinctly
stated the present position of the Court, even though spoken twenty-
five years earlier, when he stated 63 "I would not suggest that ... ho-
mosexuality . . . [is] immune from criminal inquiry, however pri-
vately practiced." 64
The Court had never before given plenary consideration to
whether a homosexual had a constitutional right of privacy to engage
in homosexual activity until Hardwick. Prior to Hardwick, the Court
had refused to review a lower court's conviction of an individual en-
gaged in private, consensual homosexual sodomy. 65 In another deci-
sion, the Court summarily affirmed 66 a lower court's holding that
56. D. O'BRIEN, supra note 29, at 191.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 1.
59. See Will, What Right To Be Let Alone?, Wash. Post, July 3, 1986, at A23, col. 6.
Although George Will supported the decision, he criticized the Court's opinion in
Hardwick, not for failure to recognize sexual autonomy per se, but for couching its ra-
tionale in the finding that the Constitution's language and design prohibited recogni-
tion of the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. George Will believed the Court
really "has been skiing down a slippery slope of judicial legislation, manufacturing pri-
vacy rights lickety-split. Now White and four others want to stop." Id. George Will
apparently believed that if the Court is manufacturing rights of privacy, there is no
logical reason to stop at homosexual sodomy.
60. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844-45 n.5, 6 (1986).
61. Id. at 2846. But see infra note 175, for a discussion of a current American poll
supporting the view that oral sexual acts are within normal societal standards.
62. Stengal, Sex Busters, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 12. He believed that the sodomy
statutes are a manifestation of a new moral militancy evident in communities around
the country.
63. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 552.
65. Enslin v. Wallford, 565 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert denied sub nom., Enslin v.
Bean, 436 U.S. 912 (1977).
66. Since the Court has obligatory jurisdiction over appeals, orders summarily qf-
firming or dismissing for want of a substantial federal question are decisions on the
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"[t]he Constitution condemns state legislation . . . [regulating per-
sonal sexual conduct when it] trespasses upon the privacy of the inci-
dents of marriage ... home or... family life."67 By virtue of these
two rulings, the Court confined permissible sexual conduct to the
traditional contexts of marriage, procreation, and family, and demon-
strated no recognition of permissible homosexual privacy.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Michael Hardwick was arrested and charged by the Atlanta police
in August of 1982 for committing the crime of sodomy6 8 in the bed-
room of his apartment.69 After a hearing in municipal court, Hard-
wick's case was bound over to the superior court.70 The district
attorney, however, decided not to present the case to the grand jury
unless further evidence developed.71
Hardwick then filed a complaint 72 in federal district court asking
that the Georgia sodomy statute be declared unconstitutional.7 3 The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss 74 for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the
motion,75 ruling that Hardwick was the only plaintiff who had stand-
ing to sue,76 and that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
merits and binding on lower courts. See Note, The Precedential Effect of Summarily
Affirmances and Dismissals For Want of Federal Question by the Supreme Court af-
ter Hicks v. Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REV. 117 (1978) (summarily
affirming a lower court's decision for want of a substantial federal question constitutes
a decision on the merits and binding on lower courts).
67. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See Fuller, Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to
Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 973 (1985).
68. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985).
69. Press, A Government in the Bedroom, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at 36. The po-
lice officer found Hardwick and another man engaged in oral sex.
70. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
71. Id.
72. The complaint named the following as defendants: Michael Bowers, Attorney
General of Georgia; Lewis Slaton, District Attorney for Fulton County; and George
Napper, Public Safety Commissioner of Atlanta. Id.
73. Id.
74. The motion to dismiss is included in the Writ of Certiorari.
75. 760 F.2d at 1204.
76. In addition, John and Mary Doe were named as plaintiffs. They alleged that
they were lawfully married and "have [an] ambition to engage in activities proscribed
by the Georgia Sodomy statute." Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986) (No. 85-140). The Does were never arrested nor threatened with arrest
for violating the statute. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Does did not have stand-
ing to sue. 760 F.2d at 1204-07.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 77 foreclosed his constitutional chal-
lenge to the statute.7 8
Subsequently, Hardwick appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court agreed that only Hardwick had
standing to sue.79 As to the precedential value of Doe, the court held
that it was not dispositive of the constitutional issues because the
Supreme Court could have based its summary affirmance on Doe's
lack of standing.8 0 In addition, the appellate court believed that doc-
trinal developments after Doe stripped it of any precedential value.8 1
More importantly, the court, relying on previous Supreme Court
cases on right of privacy, held that the sodomy statute contravened
Hardwick's fundamental right of privacy.8 2 The appellate court con-
cluded that the "activity he hopes to engage in is quintessentially pri-
vate and ... [is] beyond the proper reach of state regulation." 83 It
found that this fundamental right was protected by the ninth amend-
ment and the "notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 4 The appellate
court held that the state must show both a compelling interest in reg-
ulating such behavior and that the statute was narrowly drawn to
serve that interest in order to prevail.85 The appellate court then re-
manded the case to district court for trial.
Defendants filed for a rehearing and for a rehearing en banc,8 6
both of which were denied.8 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of conflicting judgments in other circuits to that of the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.88
The opinion of the eleventh circuit was reversed by the Supreme
Court's ultimate holding that Hardwick did not have a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual activity-in private or otherwise.
Therefore, it could not be protected by the Constitution.8 9
77. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would have set
the case for oral argument. Id.
78. 760 F.2d at 1204.
79. Id. at 1204-07. The Does did not have standing to sue because they were never
arrested under the statute. Id. See supra note 76.
80. Id. at 1207-08.
81. Id. at 1208-10.
82. Id. at 1212.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1213.
86. Id.
87. Hardwick v. Bowers, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
89. Id. at 2843-47.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority and Concurring Opinions
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice White9o began by stating that the major issue before the
Court91 was "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamen-
tal right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy .... "92 The major-
ity disagreed with the lower court's finding93 that homosexuals have
a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. It thereby exercised judi-
cial restraint and narrowed its definition of the right of privacy.
Justice White also disagreed with the lower court's analysis of the
right of privacy cases.94 The Court's previous right of privacy cases,
Justice White explained, fell into three areas: family,9 5 marriage,96
and procreation.97 He noted that "[there is] [n]o connection between
family, marriage, procreation.., and homosexual activity."98 Indeed,
prior decisions have not stood for "the proposition that any kind of
private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally
insulated."99 He further concluded that these decisions specifically
stated that the Constitution did not afford protection in the area of
90. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at 2842.
91. Id. at 2843. Justice White also stated that the Court will not discuss whether
laws against "sodomy... are wise or desirable ... [or whether the states have a right]
to repeal their laws ... or of state court decisions invalidating laws on state constitu-
tional grounds." Id. Also, the Court dispensed with review of the court of appeals' de-
cision not to follow its summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney by
giving plenary consideration to Hardwick. Id. at 2843 n.4.
92. Id. at 2843. In the Respondent's Brief, the issue before the Court was stated
differently. Hardwick stated that the issue was "whether a state must have a substan-
tial justification [for the statute] when it reaches that far into so private a realm." Re-
spondent's Brief at 5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (No. 85-140).
93. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985). The lower court
stated that Hardwick had a right because the "activity he hope[d] to engage in was
quintessentially private." Id.
94. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
95. See supra note 34-37 and accompanying text. See also Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (a state's right to enforce child labor laws upon the parents).
96. For a case dealing with marriage see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See
also supra notes 3 and 32.
97. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization of criminals prohibited). See also supra notes 1, 3, and
40.
98. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
99. Id.
private sexual relations.1o
The Court avoided creating a new fundamental right by identifying
two areas endemic to those rights.1o1 Rights that fall within either of
these two categories qualify for constitutional protection.10 2 Only
those "rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed
* . .103 [or those rights] deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition"1o4 are considered fundamental. According to the majority,
homosexual sodomy does not fit into either category. 0 5 The ration-
ale was that "[p]roscriptions against [such] conduct have ancient
roots,"O6 and even today twenty-four states and the District of Co-
lumbia outlaw sodomy.107 Consequently, the Court refused to recog-
nize homosexual sodomy as a new right worthy of receiving
protection under the Constitution.
The majority was also unwilling to create a new fundamental right
within the penumbraO8 of the Bill of Rights, thus avoiding a "Loch-
ner Era"' 09 type holding. Therefore, the only way sodomy could be
accepted as a fundamental right would be for the Court to redefine
the aforementioned categories.o1 0 A decision of that nature, Justice
White argued, would essentially turn the Court into a nine-person
legislature.ii'
100. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17
(1977)). This statement by Justice White was conclusionary. The footnote in Carey ac-
tually states the following: "As we observe below, 'the Court has not definitely an-
swered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits
state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults'. . . and we
do not purport to answer that question now." Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5. The Court
had not decided the issue at that time.
101. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). See also D.
O'BRIEN, supra note 29, at 181. O'Brien stated that after Griswold, the Court ex-
panded the right of privacy but substituted "privacy" for "liberty" and therefore nar-
rowly construed the range of protected privacy claims. He claimed that the Court
failed to heed Justice Black's warning in Griswold that "'one of the most effective
ways of diluting ... a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial
word . . . another word . . . less flexible and more . . . restricted in meaning.'" D.
O'BRIEN, supra note 29, at 181 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
104. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2845-46 (quoting Survey on the Constitutional Right of Privacy in the
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526 (1986)).
108. Id. at 2846. See also supra note 1.
109. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
111. Id. "This decision was just another vote [from] the Court sitting as a nine-per-
son legislature." Will, What Right to be Let Alone?, Wash. Post, July 3, 1986, at A23,
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Next, the Court examined Hardwick's assertion that homosexual
conduct occurring in the home should be accorded special constitu-
tional protection." 2 Although sodomy may not be protected outside
the home, Hardwick argued that the home should insulate his con-
duct from state scrutiny."l 3 Hardwick relied principally on Stanley v.
Georgia114 which held that the "First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit [the state from] making mere private possession of obscene
material a crime ... by [an] individual in the privacy of his own
home." 11 5 The majority refused to accept this argument for two rea-
sons. First, the Court believed that Stanley was firmly entrenched
within the first amendment's freedom of speech protection."i 6 Sec-
ond, Hardwick's claim that the home would insulate his conduct from
state scrutiny, by contrast, had no similar support in the Constitu-
tion.1 7 The Court, fearful of using the home as a shield to protect
"otherwise illegal conduct"" 8 from the arm of the law, was "unwill-
ing to start down that road."11 9
Lastly, the majority rejected Hardwick's contention that morality
was an insufficient rational basis 20 for the statute.' 2 ' Justice White
stated that the law is "constantly based on notions of morality,"'122
and the promotion of morality is a legitimate state interest. 12 3 Fur-
ther, in keeping within the Court's policy of not invading the terri-
tory of the state legislature, the Court was unwilling to invalidate the
col. 6. According to George Will, the Court always sits as a nine-person legislature.
See also supra note 59.
112. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
113. Brief for Respondent at 14-16, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (No.
85-140).
114. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
115. Id. at 568.
116. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. However, the opinion in Stanley makes reference
to privacy rights. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. The Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973) and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977), noted that Stanley is rooted in first
amendment concerns but discussed this in the context of the right of privacy. See also
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 147 (1969) (a discussion of the Stan-
ley decision and its implication on the right of privacy); J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 843.
117. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
118. Id. This refers to victimless crimes and sexual crimes such as adultery and
incest.
119. Id.
120. An in-depth analysis of standards of review is outside the scope of this note.
Briefly, rational basis review is the lowest level of judicial scrutiny employed by the
courts. It requires only that legislation be rationally related to legitimate state inter-
ests. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 591.
121. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
122. Id.
123. Id.
laws in "some 25 states"'12 4 put forth by elected state officials.
2. Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion reiterated the majority's
holding that homosexual sodomy received no protection under the
Constitution.125 He premised his opinion on the fact that "proscrip-
tions against sodomy have ancient roots" 2 6 and, therefore, the Court
should leave such regulation to the states.127
Justice Powell's concurring opinion also agreed with the majority's
view that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not afford protection to homosexual sodomy.128 He indicated that he
would have voted129 with the minority on eighth amendment 3 0
grounds if they had been applicable. Justice Powell stated that a pos-
sible prison sentence of one to twenty years for a single act of sod-
omy "would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue."131 The
possible sentence for a conviction of sodomy is the same as for the
violent felonies of robberyl32 and first degree arson.133 Since Hard-
wick was neither charged nor convicted 3 4 and had failed to raise an
eighth amendment issue in the lower courts, Justice Powell noted
that this constitutional issue was not before the Court, and voted
with the majority in upholding the statute.135
124. Id. at 2847 n.1. (the Court listed the appropriate statutes in each state).
125. Id. at 2847.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For a discussion of Justice Powell's "swing vote," see Kamen, Powell Changed
Vote in Sodomy Case, Wash. Post, July 13, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Justice Powell allegedly
voted with the minority because the penalty for sodomy was the same as for more seri-
ous felonies. He felt that this violated the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause. He subsequently changed his mind because Hardwick was never
charged or convicted. Id.
130. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Downing v. Perini,
518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), where the court noted, "[t]he Supreme Court has never
held a sentence of imprisonment to constitute cruel and unusual punishment solely be-
cause of length." Id. at 1290. The court went on to state "that a sentence which is dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is administered may be held to violate the
Eighth Amendment solely because of the length of imprisonment imposed." Id.
131. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847.
132. The statute states in pertinent part: "(b) A person convicted of the offense of
robbery shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one or more than 20
years." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-40 (1984). Compare supra note 7.
133. The statute states in pertinent part: "(b) A person convicted of... arson ...
shall be punished by .. .imprisonment for not less than one or more than 20 years
.... .GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-60 (1968). Compare supra note 7.
134. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
135. Id.
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun began his dissentl 36 by disagreeing with the ma-
jority's view that this case concerned a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy. Rather, he believed the case was about the
most "comprehensive of rights . . . namely, the right to be let
alone."i 37 Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's rationalization
that the historical condemnation of sodomy should be dispositive in
deciding the constitutional issue before the Court. 38
First, since the statute on its face, applied to both homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy,' 39 Justice Blackmun attacked the majority's
obsessive focus on homosexual activity. He believed that Georgia was
only willing to enforce the statute against homosexuals and not
against heterosexuals.140 Even if that were the case, he argued, the
claimed right of privacy in Hardwick is that of intimate associa-
tion, 41 whether it be homosexual or heterosexual.
Second, he attacked the majority's failure to consider possible pro-
cedural errors surrounding the dismissal of Hardwick's complaint
under the Federal Rules4 2 for failure to state a claim.143 Justice
Blackmun contended that if the Court could provide relief on any
possible theory, the district court's motion to dismiss would not be
controlling. 44 Therefore, even if Hardwick did not state all possible
136. Id. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens.
137. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). The statement, "the right to be let alone," is not a constitutional right;
rather, it is more a rhetorical flourish of words that enlivens his dissent. The state-
ment was authored in Brandeis & Warren, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). The concept of privacy in that article was based on tort principles.
138. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
139. Id. See statute cited supra note 7.
140. The Georgia Attorney General conceded that the statute would be unenforce-
able if applied to a married couple. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10.
141. Id. at 2849. See supra note 3, for the areas protected under the right of pri-
vacy. They do not include the right of intimate association. Justice Blackmun essen-
tially advocated a new right of privacy.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
143. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
144. Id. An in-depth analysis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is outside of
the scope of this note. Some jurisdictions follow the principle that if a court could pro-
vide any possible relief on any possible theory, a motion to dismiss should be denied.
See Lada v. Wilkie, 250 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1957); see generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1357, 1216 (1969) (a motion to dismiss
should not be granted unless the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under the facts
of the claim).
causes of action, other constitutional provisions, although not plead,
that could have provided him relief should have been considered.
Justice Blackmun failed to pursue this issue. Instead, he attacked
the majority's opinion on the grounds that the statute violated Hard-
wick's right of privacy and freedom of intimate association.14 5
Justice Blackmun stated his belief that the right of privacy is a bi-
furcated concept and that each element supported a finding of a vio-
lation of Hardwick's fundamental right.' 46 The first element he
identified was the right to make certain decisions.' 47 These decisions,
though centered around the family, were in actuality protected rights
because "they form[ed] so central a part of an individual's life."' 48
He argued that the cases dealing with the right to have a child in-
voked constitutional protection because the decision of parenthood
"alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition."' 49 The cases
protecting the decision whether to marry were based upon the con-
cept that marriage is a partnership that "'promotes a way of life, not
causes [a way of life].' "150 Since the individual was central to all of
these protected rights, and sexual intimacy is an integral part of the
development of the individual, it should be included in these pro-
tected rights.' 51 Justice Blackmun argued that in a nation as diverse
as ours, the majority erred in holding that homosexual sodomy
should go unprotected because it is a "wrong" way of life. He be-
lieved that a way of life that is different but "interferes with no
rights or interest of others"' 52 should be protected by the
Constitution.
Justice Blackmun felt that the second element comprising the con-
cept of privacy is the protection of the physical integrity of the home
under the fourth amendment. 53 He disagreed with the majority's in-
terpretation of Stanley.5 4 He argued that Stanley stood for the pro-
145. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50. See generally Bice, The Limited Grant of Cer-
tiorari and the Justification of Judicial Review, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 343 (examining the
limited power of review by the Court on a writ of certiorari).
146. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2850-51.
147. Id. at 2850. See supra note 3.
148. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851.
149. Id. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187
n.6 (1986).
150. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
151. Id. (citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
152. Id. at 2852.
153. "The right of the people to be secure in their... houses... against unreasona-
ble search and seizures .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (an analysis of fourth amendment protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures); Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia,
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 203, 205 (fourth amendment right of privacy extended as a privacy
right).
154. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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tection of the right to read obscene material and the right to satisfy a
man's intellect in the privacy of his own home.155 These elements in
combination provided Hardwick with the fundamental right to con-
duct sexual relationships in the privacy of his own home. To Justice
Blackmun, this was the mainstay of the right of privacy under our
constitution. 156
The majority believed Stanley's protection was limited to the first
amendment because of its fear of protecting otherwise illegal conduct
in the home.157 Justice Blackmun found that the majority's compari-
son of homosexual sodomy done in the privacy of the home, to vic-
timless crimes such as possession of drugs, firearms, and stolen goods,
was lacking in merit. These crimes, he argued, are not truly vic-
timless and have a more pernicious affect on society than homosex-
ual sodomy. More importantly, the majority's conclusions were
unsupported since there was no evidence presented in the lower
court on this issue, due to the dismissal of Hardwick's claim.158
Justice Blackmun concluded by stating that the Court should not
deprive a person of liberty merely because the conduct has ancient
proscriptions, contravenes existing order, or is contrary to a millen-
nium of religious teachings.159 Justice Blackmun argued that the
case was not about public sexual activity or interference with any
rights of others. Rather, it was about "invading the house, hearts,
and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently."160
2. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens focused his dissentl6l on two questions: 1) whether
a state may prohibit all classifications of sodomy by applying a neu-
tral law to all citizens in its jurisdiction; and 2) if not, whether the
state can save the statute by stating that it applies only to homosex-
ual sodomy.162
In addressing the first question, he believed the prior cases decided
by the Court supported the conclusion that the statute could not be
155. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2852.
156. Id. at 2853.
157. Id. at 2846. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 2853.
159. Id. at 2854-55.
160. Id. at 2856.
161. Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
162. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2857.
enforced against a married couple.163 The Court deemed that the
"intimacies of [a married person's] physical relationship, even when
not intended to produce offspring, are ... protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."164 This rationale has
also been extended to unmarried individuals as well. 165 He noted
that even though history and tradition have viewed sodomy as im-
moral, this Court has established the bedroom as sacrosanct, whether
it contains married or unmarried heterosexual adults.166 Thus, the
state could not prohibit all classifications of sodomy by applying the
neutral law.
Since a state could not constitutionally prohibit all sodomy, Justice
Stevens attacked the enforcement of the statute against only homo-
sexuals. He disputed the majority's opinion that Georgia properly
justified the selective application of the statute to only homosexual
sodomy.167 The majority justified this selective application on the be-
lief that the majority of the citizens of Georgia found homosexual
sodomy immoral. This selective application, Justice Stevens argued,
"must be supported by a neutral and legitimate [state] interest -
something more substantial than a habitual dislike for or... disfavor
[of a] group."'168 More importantly, he concluded, even though Hard-
wick admitted he would continue such conduct, he was never
charged.169 The failure of the state to prosecute Hardwick under-
mined its stated rationale that selective application promotes moral-
ity among the general public.170 In conclusion, Justice Stevens felt
that Hardwick's complaint alleged a constitutional claim and should
have withstood the motion to dismiss.1 7 1
V. THE IMPACT
The decision by the Court exemplified judicial restraint. For the
past sixty years, an activist Court recognized, as fundamental, rights
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. These rights, how-
163. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
164. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
165. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
166. Id. at 2858. Cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
167. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846, 2858-59. A discussion of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment is beyond the scope of this note. For a more com-
plete discussion, see Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional,
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 675-80 (1985) (the equal protection analysis as it relates to
sodomy statutes applied to homosexuals); Note, Presumption Doctrine: Equal Protec-
tion or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974) (in-depth analysis of equal protec-
tion relating to the right of privacy).
168. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858-59.
169. See supra text accompanying note 71.
170. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2859.
171. Id. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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ever, never included the right to engage in any sexual conduct. The
holding in Hardwick specifically stated there has never been a consti-
tutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy. However, the opin-
ion hinted that the Constitution does not protect any sexual conduct
between unmarried heterosexuals. Is this opinion a harbinger of a
dangerous new trend of the Court? Does it signal the beginning of
limiting the previous rights of privacy granted by the Court? To ex-
amine these questions, a closer look at each of the societal segments
affected must be taken.
A. The Heterosexual Community
The Court previously recognized new rights of privacy by striking
down old laws.172 The majority in Hardwick held that the Constitu-
tion failed to protect homosexual sodomy largely because the laws
prohibiting it are based in an ancient historical context. This holding
departs radically from previous interpretations of the right of privacy
under the Constitution.173 The Court rationalized its decision in
Hardwick based on the criminality of sodomy dating back to colonial
times. Statutes prohibiting miscegenation, like criminal sodomy stat-
utes, were also commonly promulgated during colonial times. How-
ever, the Court struck down those statutes and held that individuals
had the freedom of choice to marry whomever they chose.174 The
Court's prior decision on miscegenation recognized modern society as
being substantially different from the one that existed two hundred
years ago and interpreted the Constitution to coincide with a "chang-
ing society." In Hardwick, the Court failed to do so.
If the current Court continues to interpret the Constitution based
upon historical precedents reflected in old statutes, the efficacy could
chill the recognition of new rights for heterosexuals. In the 1980's, as
many as eighty percent of all Americans consider oral sex to be a
normal sexual activity.175 Heterosexual couples, married or unmar-
ried, believe that the prohibited conduct can play an important role
in the development of their intimate relationships.176 The majority
172. See supra note 3.
173. Lorence & Ogden, Does Sodomy Decision Give History Its Due... Or Does It
Try To Fossilize The Constitution?, Legal Times, July 21, 1986, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter
Lorence & Ogden].
174. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also supra notes 3 and 32.
175. Lorence & Ogden, supra note 173, at 12 (referring to amicus brief filed by the
American Psychological Association and the American Public Health Association).
176. Lorence & Ogden, supra note 173, at 5 (referring to amicus brief filed by the
American Psychological Association and the American Public Health Association).
failed to consider that sodomy may have a different social context
and psychological significance today than two hundred years ago.
Justice Brennan properly stated the belief that constitutional inter-
pretation should reflect a changing society: "[T]he genius of the Con-
stitution rests not in any static meaning... but in the adaptability of
its great principles to cope with current problems and current
needs."177 The holding in Hardwick may have a broad impact on the
future recognition of new rights of privacy for heterosexuals.
However, the impact on the heterosexual community may be lim-
ited. The Attorney General for the State of Georgia in Hardwick
stated that the statute would not have been constitutional if applied
to married couples.178 It is arguable that all sexual conduct between
unmarried heterosexuals would fall within the procreative category
of the right of privacy and would be protected by the Constitution. If
this argument is accepted, the holding in Hardwick may have an ex-
tremely limited direct legal impact on either married or unmarried
heterosexuals.
B. The Homosexual Community
1. The Direct Legal Impact
There is no doubt that homosexuals suffered the most from the de-
cision in Hardwick. However, since sodomy laws are generally use-
less and unenforceable, they neea not fear bedroom raids. While
homosexuals suffered in the courtroom, they may have won in the
eyes of the general public. One opinion poll showed fifty-seven per-
cent of the people polled believed the state should not have the right
to prohibit sexual conduct between consenting adults.17 9 Forty-seven
percent of those polled disapproved of the holding in Hardwick.l8 0
One commentator felt that Hardwick will affect homosexuals the
way the Dred Scott v. Sandford's' decision affected blacks.182 Con-
versely, conservatives have applauded the Hardwick decision as a sig-
nal that "immoral conduct" is not accepted in this country.
The homosexual community believed that the decision would re-
sult in nationwide discrimination and violence directed toward gays.
In addition, the decision may permeate other aspects of homosexuals'
177. Lorence & Ogden, supra note 173, at 5 (quoting a speech by Justice Brennan at
Georgetown University).
178. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10.
179. Chase, A Government in the Bedroom, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at 38. The
Gallup Poll organization conducted this survey.
180. Id.
181. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The Court held that blacks were not citizens of the United
States and therefore did not have constitutional rights. Id.
182. Staff, A Giant Step Backward, THE BODY POL., Aug. 1986 at 18. THE BODY
POLITIC is a periodical that caters to gay and lesbians.
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lives. One gay magazine reported that contracts between gay lovers
may become void based on the principal of illegality. 8 3 Employers
who are anti-gay may use the decision to have homosexuals fired
from their present jobs. Furthermore, the decision could be used
against homosexuals seeking custody of their children.184 The possi-
ble argument is that homosexuals are habitually in violation of the
law.
Moreover, the decision may fuel bias against homosexuals in future
legislation and effect their efforts to overturn remaining sodomy stat-
utes. In light of this, politically active homosexuals have focused
their efforts on appointing liberal judges and supporting the election
of senators who advocate and support homosexual rights.'5 5 Also,
gay task forces have been established in states that still enforce sod-
omy laws.'8 6 The gay community has used the decision in Hardwick
to solidify its movement to gain recognition of their rights.
The Supreme Court, one of the most powerful and venerable insti-
tutions in America, may have put a stamp of legitimacy on homosex-
ual bias. There is little doubt that homosexuality is widely practiced
in this country. The Court failed to consider that homosexuals will
never be protected by the right of privacy because their lifestyle and
sexual activities do not fit within the traditional categories of mar-
riage, family, and procreation.
2. The Rehnquist Court
Justice Rehnquist, who replaced Chief Justice Burger as Chief Jus-
tice,'8 7 voted with the majority in Hardwick. Although he did not
write an opinion, his support of the decision gives homosexuals an in-
dication of his position regarding homosexual issues.
In addition, Antonio Scalia has replaced Justice Rehnquist as an
Associate Justice. Prior to his appointment to the Court, Scalia was a
judge in the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit. The most recent case before that court that dealt with homo-
183. Id. at 17. For a discussion of illegality in contracts, see generally 17 AM. JUR.
2D Contracts §§ 216-239 (1964).
184. Walter, High Court Upholds Sodomy Law, THE ADVOC., Aug. 5, 1986, at 11.
THE ADVOCATE is a periodical that caters to gays and lesbians.
185. Id. (comment from Jeff Levi, Executive Director for National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force).
186. Id.
187. Justice Rehnquist was confirmed as Chief Justice by the Senate on September
17, 1986.
sexual issues was Dronenburg v. Zech.188 The court held that the
Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct did not
violate any constitutional right of privacy.189 Scalia voted with the
majority. The majority opinion emphasized that homosexual sodomy
was not a right protected under any previous Supreme Court rul-
ing.190 It seems consistent with these facts to infer from the previous
voting records of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia that they
9hare a similar belief that homosexuals do not have a constitutional
right to engage in sodomy. Homosexuals have had an uphill battle
with the restrictive Burger Court and will now discover the Rehn-
quist Court is equally willing to exercise judicial restraint when de-
ciding homosexual issues.
3. Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment
The ability of the homosexual community to overturn the remain-
ing sodomy statutes may rest on eighth amendment grounds. The
eighth amendment prohibits penalties excessively cruel or unusual in
relation to the crime involved.1 91 In Georgia, sodomy carries the
same penalty as violent crimes such as robbery.192 Justice Powell, in
his concurring opinion, indicated that a conviction of one to twenty
years for sodomy created serious eighth amendment issues. 193 There-
fore, the penalties for sodomy may violate the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment clause and statutes may be held un-
constitutional on those grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether the judicial restraint exercised in Hardwick
is a signal of a dangerous new trend by the Court in the area of the
right of privacy. The decision can be interpreted narrowly. The zone
of privacy previously recognized by the Court never included homo-
sexual sodomy. Therefore, the Hardwick decision may signal a con-
tinued trend that does not recognize "sexual activities" as falling
within the gambit of a constitutionally protected right.
The decision, however, can also be interpreted broadly. If the
Court continues to uphold laws based on notions of "venerable
birth," it threatens to fossilize the Constitution. The Court could
then refuse to examine the issues in today's social and psychological
188. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
189. 741 F.2d at 1398.
190. Id. at 1395.
191. See supra note 130.
192. Id. See statute cited supra note 132 and accompanying text.
193. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847. See also supra notes 129-34 and accompanying
text.
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context. The result could be a narrowing of the protected right of
privacy for everyone.
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